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Abstract
Time-saving goods are defined as market goods that reduce home labor
requirements (e.g. restaurants; washing machines). Assuming that time savings are
costly, this paper shows that lower-income individuals can purchase fewer time
savings and enjoy less leisure time. Commodity tax rates affecting low-income
individuals should depend more on time savings, and less on the classic Corlett and
Hague rule. The related literature suggests to impose lower tax rates on goods that
require less home labor. This paper shows that goods that offer greater time savings
with respect to their more affordable substitutes should also receive favorable tax
treatment.
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1. Introduction
This paper introduces the concept of time-saving goods into the theory of optimal
commodity taxation and proposes an adjustment to the traditional Corlett and Hague (1953-54)
rule. Provided that the time constraint is used up with market labor, leisure, and home labor,
time-saving goods are here defined as market goods or services that allow the individual to
reduce the time devoted to home or non-market labor, leaving more time available for incomegenerating market labor and enjoyable leisure. Based on Becker’s (1965) seminal contribution,
the literature has analyzed how optimal taxation results change when it is necessary to use home
labor to convert market goods into (using Becker’s terminology) basic commodities that are the
direct source of utility. This paper shows that high-income individuals are better able to
“purchase more time” through the time-saving goods available in the market, and thus
systematically enjoy more leisure than low-income individuals. The resulting difference in the
allocation of time between high- and low-income individuals affects the optimal tax rules and
justifies the use of differential commodity taxes.
Time-allocation decisions, and particularly the choice of leisure, have traditionally been a
central element of optimal tax theory. At the individual level, and given that leisure cannot be
directly taxed, the well-established Corlett and Hague (1953-54) rule states that optimal tax rates
should be higher for those goods that are more complementary with leisure. In the context of
many taxpayers, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) show that if preferences for goods are weakly
separable from leisure, differential commodity taxation is suboptimal. If weak separability does
not hold, however, the applicability of Corlett and Hague rule can be extended to the multiperson economy (Nava, Schroyen and Marchand 1996). The literature incorporating home labor
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in the derivation of optimal tax rules has built upon these results and showed that goods that are
more time consuming should bear greater tax rates (Gahvari and Yang 1993; Kleven, Richter and
Sorensen 2000; Kleven 2004; Boadway and Gahvari 2006). In particular, Boadway and Gahvari
(2006) allow for home labor to be either a leisure-substitute, in which case consumption time has
no opportunity cost because it is enjoyable (like leisure), or a labor-substitute, in which case
consumption time is not enjoyable and thus faces the opportunity cost of not working. Only labor
substitution creates distortions not accounted for in the traditional Corlett and Hague rule, and
thus the more the time spent on home labor the greater the adjustment required on the optimal
tax rate derived under that rule.
A common assumption in the literature on optimal taxation with home labor is that each
basic commodity is produced with a fixed proportion of market goods and home labor. This
assumption suggests that the technology available to produce a basic commodity is unique and
there is only one market good available to produce it. In practice, however, there may be many
market goods available to produce the same basic commodity, and these goods are most often
associated with alternative production technologies requiring different amounts of home labor.
For example, the basic commodity “dinner” can be produced with some market good “food” and
a certain amount of home labor devoted to purchasing the food, cooking, eating, and cleaning; or
alternatively, with the market good “restaurant dinner” and a likely smaller amount of home
labor.
This paper takes a closer look into the production process and the consumption choices
pertaining to each basic commodity. It keeps the assumption of fixed proportions between each
market good and home labor, but allows for substitution among alternative market goods to
produce the same basic commodity. As a result, the home labor requirement of a basic
2

commodity depends on the specific market good used, which is associated with different time
savings. The concept of a time-saving good encompasses not only the time required for
consuming the basic commodity, but also qualitative attributes of the market good. To the extent
that a qualitative attribute, added as an improvement to a market good, makes a basic commodity
enjoyable – as in the case of a “nice” car or restaurant – then it allows a consumer to transform
home labor into leisure (or a labor-substitute activity into a leisure-substitute activity). By
definition, these cases can also be considered as time savings.
Other things equal, market goods that provide greater time savings can be expected to
have a higher price. This is a key assumption made in this paper, and implies that greater time
savings are available for individuals with higher incomes. Two polar opposite cases are used to
illustrate the effects of time-saving goods on optimal tax rules. Individuals with sufficiently high
levels of income may be able to completely eliminate home labor, such that total time available
is used up with leisure and market labor, as in the traditional time allocation model without home
production. In contrast, individuals with sufficiently low levels of income may be unable to
purchase significant time savings, which may force them to reduce and even eliminate leisure
time. The need for home labor in the production of basic commodities and the presence of costly
time savings imply that income inequalities are associated with time inequalities, a concept that
has not been formally described in the literature.
Costly time savings and time inequalities have important consequences for the theory of
optimal taxation. Since high-income individuals are better able to reduce home labor, the
traditional optimal tax rules (derived without considering home production) can be more directly
applied to them. Home labor can be expected to increase as the income level is reduced, and this
paper shows that in this (more general) case the Corlett and Hague rule must be accompanied
3

with an additional “time-saving rule” that accounts for the level of time savings and for the
marginal (negative) effects of taxes on time savings: Goods that offer greater time savings per
dollar (both in average and in the margin) should be assigned a tax rate lower than the one
suggested by the Corlett and Hague rule. The reason is that for any given tax burden, individual
utility is higher when home labor is reduced. Moreover, in the particular low-income case with
no leisure, the complementarity of market goods and leisure is no longer relevant, and only the
(average) time-saving rule determines the optimal commodity tax rates.
The (average) time-saving rule is largely compatible with previous results in the
literature. When time savings allow to fully eliminate home labor, consumption time can be
characterized as (or it is replaced by) leisure time. The same as under the Boadway and
Gahvari’s (2006) framework, where this case corresponds to a scenario in which all goods are
leisure-substitutes, the classical Corlett and Hague result remains as the only relevant tax rule. In
contrast, the presence of home labor or goods that are labor-substitutes is generally recognized as
a source of additional distortions, and the literature agrees that goods that require more home
labor should be taxed more heavily. In this context, the time-saving rule qualifies previous
results in Gahvari and Yang (1993), Kleven, Richter and Sorensen (2000), Kleven (2004), and
Boadway and Gahvari (2006) in two ways. First, the relevance of alternative optimal tax rules
depends not only on predetermined home labor requirements of basic commodities, but on the
level of income. By allowing for costly time savings and for substitution among market goods in
the production of a given basic commodity, a change in the level of income is shown to affect the
amount of home labor. When low-income individuals cannot afford substantial time savings,
they are compelled to spend more time on home labor; therefore, implementing a tax rule that
penalizes home labor implies that they face higher tax rates than high-income individuals.
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Besides the obvious equity concerns, the problem with such a rule is that higher taxes
may force low-income individuals to increase home labor even more. This can lead to greater
marginal welfare costs of taxation or even to a reduction of tax collections, which by itself
justifies a lower tax burden. The second qualification addresses this problem: Optimal
commodity tax rates do not depend only on the amount of time savings (or home labor)
associated with market goods, but also on the marginal effect of the tax rate on those time
savings. A higher tax rate can induce a taxpayer to replace a market good with another, more
affordable, market good that saves less time. As a result, the full price of the basic commodity,
equal to the price of the market good plus the opportunity cost of home labor, increases at a rate
greater than the tax rate. Optimal tax rates should be lower when their marginal effect on time
savings is greater. Goods that offer greater time savings compared to their more affordable
substitutes, should be taxed at lower rates.
Examples of time-saving goods that may be assigned low tax rates at the optimal solution
proposed in this paper, but have been associated with higher optimal tax rates in the related
literature, are those used for transportation. As long as some market goods allow low-income
individuals to obtain significant time savings with respect to alternative means of transportation
(e.g. cars with respect to buses; or buses with respect to bicycles), they should be favored with
lower tax rates and it may even be optimal for the government to subsidize them. The tax system
should not penalize low-income individuals for using time-consuming means of transportation,
but instead it may have to help making time-saving means of transportation more affordable.
The framework developed in this paper, in which market goods can replace each other in
the production of basic commodities, is generally incompatible with the assumptions of
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hometheticity among market goods and weak separability of market goods and leisure.1 This
means that the classic uniformity results due to Sandmo (1974) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)
do not hold in this framework. The presence of time-saving goods ensures that there is a role for
differential commodity taxation and the time-saving rule derived in this paper even when income
taxes are set optimally.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the effect of income changes on
home production in the presence of time-saving goods. Section 3 solves the time allocation
problem with one basic commodity and introduces the concept of time inequality. Section 4
considers many basic commodities and analyzes the effect of time savings on basic optimal tax
rules. Section 5 concludes.
2. Home production with time-saving goods
Leisure 𝜌 is defined here as enjoyable time, regardless of whether it is associated with
market goods or not.2 It makes a positive contribution to utility, but it is costly to the individual.
Market labor 𝜆 is not enjoyable, but it contributes to individual welfare with income. A third
concept of time, based on Becker’s (1965) seminal paper, is home or non-market labor 𝜎, which
generates no income and is assumed to be not enjoyable, even though it is spent in producing
(either at home or not) goods that could otherwise be bought in the market. The individual time
constraint is

1

Homothetic preferences for market goods imply that spending on each market good increases proportionally with
the level of income, but this cannot happen if some goods are replaced by others. Since goods that provide more
time savings are replacing those providing less time savings as income increases, we know that there are inferior
and normal goods and thus preferences cannot be homothetic. In addition, the time-saving attribute of a good
implies that its consumption can have a direct effect on leisure and thus preferences cannot, in general, be weakly
separable between goods and leisure.
2
This definition corresponds to the concept of “full leisure” used by Boadway and Gahvari (2006), equal to the sum
of pure leisure and the time used consuming perfect leisure-substitutes.
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𝜅 =𝜌+𝜎+𝜆,

(1)

where 𝜅 is total time available.
In the home production literature a given home labor requirement 𝜎 𝑟 must be combined
with a market good 𝑥0 to produce a basic commodity 𝑧 = 𝑍(𝜎 𝑟 , 𝑥0 ), where 𝑍(∙) is a production
function. This section analyzes a case that has not yet received attention in the literature: The
production of 𝑧 when home labor 𝜎 can be reduced with time-saving goods, such that 𝜎 does not
need to be equal to 𝜎 𝑟 and, more generally, 0 ≤ 𝜎 ≤ 𝜎 𝑟 . In order to formally define time-saving
goods, the variable 𝜎 𝑟 is divided into 𝑀 mutually exclusive activities or improvements, each
representing a share or fraction of time 𝜎𝑠𝑚 (where 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝑀 and ∑𝑀
𝑚=1 𝜎𝑠𝑚 = 1) of the time
𝜎 𝑟 required to produced each unit of 𝑧, and valued at a price 𝜋𝑚 in the market.
A time-saving good is defined as a market good that reduces the amount of home labor 𝜎
used in the production of each unit of 𝑧, either because it does not require the consumer to
perform one or more activities for the production of 𝑧, or alternatively because it offers
improvements that reduce the home labor requirement or make consumption time enjoyable,
allowing the user to transform home labor time into leisure time. Time-saving goods can be used
to describe very common consumption choices in which certain activities are directly hired at a
market price (e.g. assistants, maids, gardeners, etc.) or paid for as part of the price of goods with
some value added.3 In general, time-saving goods allow the individual to increase market labor,
leisure, or both.

Prepared meals (e.g. frozen pizza) are examples of goods that save the time spent in the activity “cooking.” In
some cases market goods offer qualitative improvements that save time. A cleaner, for instance, is said to be of
better quality if, other things equal, it requires less time to remove a stain. Luxury cars are examples of market goods
that offer enjoyable improvements, which may allow to transform the home labor time used in transportation into
leisure time.
3
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For concreteness, if 𝑧 corresponds to the basic commodity “dinner,” 𝑥0 can be defined as
the market good “food,” which can be bought in the market at a price 𝑝. In order to produce one
𝑧 the individual requires one unit of 𝑥0 and a fixed amount of home labor time 𝜎 𝑟 , which can be
divided into several activities or improvements. For example, a share 𝜎𝑠1 is devoted to
purchasing the food, another share 𝜎𝑠2 is devoted to cooking, another share 𝜎𝑠3 is spent washing
the dishes, and another share 𝜎𝑠4 is spent eating. In this example, ∑4𝑚=1 𝜎𝑠𝑚 = 1. A possible
choice is to buy only food 𝑥0 at the market price 𝑝, in which case there are no time savings and
home labor 𝜎 remains equal to 𝜎 𝑟 .4 To-go food is a different market good, denoted here as 𝑥1 ,
that saves the time required to cook, such that 𝜎 = 𝜎 𝑟 − 𝜎𝑠2 , and has a market price 𝑝 + 𝜋2 𝜎𝑠2 .
Delivery food, 𝑥2 , would save the time spent on purchasing the food and cooking, so its price is
even higher and equal to 𝑝 + ∑2𝑚=1 𝜋𝑚 𝜎𝑠𝑚 . An equivalent option is to pay one or more persons
to perform these tasks. Alternatively, a visit to a restaurant, 𝑥3 , would save the time spent
cooking and washing the dishes (assuming that the time spent going there equals the time that
would have been spent purchasing food), and may add other valuable attribute like social
interaction, which may allow to transform the time share 𝜎𝑠4 of home labor into leisure time. The
resultant market price of a dinner in the restaurant is 𝑝 + ∑4𝑚=2 𝜋𝑚 𝜎𝑠𝑚 .5
The remaining of this section shows how the use of time-saving goods affects the optimal
production decision about 𝑧, which is for simplicity assumed to be the only basic commodity
produced by the individual. Following a common practice in the related literature, the production

4

Strictly speaking, given that all market goods require some labor to be produced, they can all be considered to save
time. Even the market good “food,” for instance, saves the individual the time required to collect or produce food on
her own.
5
As explained, even the time used on driving to the restaurant could be “saved” if this activity is made enjoyable,
for instance, with a luxury car. This improvement, of course, affects only the price of the car, not the price of the
dinner at the restaurant. For the purpose of the analysis, however, a market good might be assumed to be a good that
integrates all time savings accumulated in the overall experience of going to the restaurant.
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function is assumed to have a Leontief form where each unit of 𝑧 is produced with one unit of
the home labor requirement 𝜎 𝑟 and one unit of market good, thus both inputs are perfect
complements.6 Different from previous papers, however, it is assumed that the home labor can
be reduced by purchasing time-saving goods 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, … , 𝑁, each with different amounts
of valuable time savings at different prices.
For convenience, the available time-saving shares 𝜎𝑠𝑚 are assumed to be ordered from
the cheapest to the most expensive one, such that their prices satisfy 𝜋1 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝜋𝑀 . Similarly,
time-saving goods 𝑥𝑖 are ordered in terms of the total time-saving share that they offer (with 𝑥0
offering no time savings). Disregarding the possibility that different market goods may in
practice offer the same total time-saving share, each 𝑥𝑖 is assumed to add the next cheapest timesaving share to the total provided by the previous market good 𝑥𝑖−1. Taken together, these two
assumptions imply that 𝑀 = 𝑁; that any given 𝑥𝑛 adds a time-saving share 𝜎𝑠𝑛 with price 𝜋𝑛
(note the change in subscripts); and that 𝑥𝑛 has a market price 𝑝 + ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝜋𝑖 𝜎𝑠𝑖 and is the least
expensive good that provides a total time-saving share not lower than ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝜎𝑠𝑖 . Furthermore,
considering that by assumption one unit of 𝑧 always requires one unit of the market good and
one unit of the time requirement, then total time savings provided by 𝑥𝑛 are 𝑥𝑛 ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝜎𝑠𝑖 , and the
market cost of these time savings is 𝑥𝑛 ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝜋𝑖 𝜎𝑠𝑖 .
The problem of maximizing the amount of 𝑧 is twofold, as it requires not only to obtain
the optimal amount of the market good that is used to produce 𝑧, but also to determine what
precise market good(s) should be chosen. Focusing for now on the first of these two problems,

6

See Kleven (2004) and Boadway and Gahvari (2006) for examples of how home production is modeled in the
optimal taxation literature. An alternative approach can be found in Gronau (1977), who uses a more general
production function and assumes perfect substitutability between goods produced at home and goods purchased in
the market.
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and denoting total time-saving under 𝑥𝑛 as 𝜎𝑠 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝜎𝑠𝑖 to simplify notation, the Leontief
production function is defined, for any given 𝑥𝑛 , as
𝑧(𝜎, 𝜎𝑠 , 𝑥𝑛 ) = min{𝜎 + 𝑥𝑛 𝜎𝑠 , 𝑥𝑛 } .

(2)

The marginal rate of technical substitution and the optimal production condition are

𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆 = −

𝜕𝑧(𝜎,𝜎𝑠 ,𝑥𝑛 )
𝜕𝜎
𝜕𝑧(𝜎,𝜎𝑠 ,𝑥𝑛 )
𝜕𝑥𝑛

1

−
= { 𝜎𝑠
0

if 𝜎 + 𝑥𝑛 𝜎𝑠 ≤ 𝑥𝑛
if 𝜎 + 𝑥𝑛 𝜎𝑠 > 𝑥𝑛 ,

𝜎 = (1 − 𝜎𝑠 )𝑥𝑛 .

(3.a)

(3.b)

Production possibilities are limited by the following time and budget constraints:
𝜅̅ = 𝜎 + 𝜆 ,

(4.a)

𝑤𝜆 = (𝑝 + ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝜋𝑖 𝜎𝑠𝑖 )𝑥𝑛 ,

(4.b)

where 𝑤 is the wage rate. The time constraint (4.a) implicitly defines total leisure time 𝜌 = 𝜅 −
𝜅̅ as fixed.7 The optimal value of (full) leisure is determined by the utility maximization decision,
which is addressed in the next section.
Using (3.b), (4.a) and (4.b) we can obtain the optimal amounts of 𝑥𝑛 and 𝜎:
𝑥𝑛∗ =

̅
𝑤𝜅

𝜎∗ =

̅
𝑤𝜅

𝑃

𝑃

,

(5.a)

(1 − 𝜎𝑠 ) ,

(5.b)

where 𝑃 represents the “full price” of 𝑧 under 𝑥𝑛 , defined as
𝑃 = 𝑝 + ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝜋𝑖 𝜎𝑠𝑖 + 𝑤(1 − 𝜎𝑠 ) .

(5.c)

7

Note that the time saved by improvements that make consumption time enjoyable, which provides no additional
time available for production, is implicitly assumed to be exchanged with equal amounts of time spend on “pure
leisure,” such that “full leisure” 𝜌 (as defined by Boadway and Gahvari 2006), remains unchanged.
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𝑃 is equal to the market price of 𝑥𝑛 plus the monetary value of time spent on producing one unit
of basic commodity (instead of working in the market).8 A key implication of (5.c) is that as long
as 𝑤 > 𝜋𝑖 , 𝑃 decreases with 𝜎𝑠𝑖 . Whenever the price of an activity 𝑖 is lower than the wage rate,
additional time savings reduce the full price of the basic commodity and the time required for
that activity is better spent supplying labor in the market rather than in home labor.9 For this
reason, if 𝑤 > 𝜋𝑖 , a utility maximizing taxpayer will always choose to purchase the good that
saves the time spent in activity 𝑖 in the market. This result is now used to explain the choice of
the specific market good 𝑥𝑛 that maximizes the production of 𝑧.
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of using different time-saving goods on the production of 𝑧.
The horizontal axis represents total time available for labor, either at home or in the market, and
the vertical axis represents whatever market good 𝑥𝑖 is being used to produce 𝑧.10 In the absence
of time savings the optimality condition (3.b) is reduced to 𝜎 = 𝑥0 . The corresponding
equilibrium is found at 𝑒0 , where the line representing this condition intercepts the budget
constraint 𝑐0 𝜅̅. The maximum attainable level of production is 𝑧1 , which is the level of the
dashed isoquant with the typical ninety degree L-shape.

8

From this definition of the full price of 𝑧 it is possible to derive alternative expressions provided in the literature,
where it is commonly assumed that a market good 𝑥 and 𝜎 are used in fixed proportions, but where there is no
account for possible benefits and costs of time savings. For instance, Boadway and Gahvari (2006) define 𝑎 as the
fixed amount of time required to consume one unit of 𝑥. Although they do not explicitly address the production
problem, we can rewrite (2) to represent the framework implicitly used by them as 𝑧′(𝑎, 𝑥𝑛 ) = min{𝑎𝑥𝑛 , 𝑥𝑛 }. This
function leads to the optimal production condition 𝑎𝑥𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛 , which implies 𝑎 = 1. It is easy to see that the full price
of 𝑥 computed by Boadway and Gahvari (2006), 𝑝 + 𝑤𝑎, is equivalent to the full price of z in the absence of time
savings (𝜎𝑠 = 0).
9
Related papers on optimal commodity taxation in the presence of home labor do not reach this conclusion because
are based on the assumption that each basic commodity 𝑧 can be produced with only one market good that is
combined with a fixed amount of home labor. Since substitution among market goods to produce the same 𝑧 is
disregarded, utility is maximized by allowing for substitution only among different basic commodities. The problem
with the last approach is that it obscures the fact that a higher a wage rate 𝑤 allows to purchase more time savings
and thus produce the same basic commodity with less home labor, increasing the ability of the individual to produce
𝑧 and also to enjoy more leisure time.
10
Recall that by definition one unit of any market good 𝑥𝑖 is used to produce one unit of 𝑧, thus the amount of any
market good used is necessarily equal to the production of basic commodity 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑧.
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When a time-saving good 𝑥1 with time-saving share 𝜎𝑠1 is introduced, the new optimality
condition becomes 𝜎 = (1 − 𝜎𝑠1 )𝑥1 . 11 Any time-saving good would allow the individual to
reduce home labor, but the extent to which it will allow them to increase the production of 𝑧
depends on the relation between the price of the time saved, 𝜋1 , and the wage rate 𝑤. If 𝜋1 = 𝑤,
the marginal cost of reducing home labor is equal to the marginal gain from increasing market
labor. In this case the budget constraint is 𝑐1 𝜅̅ , and one unit of market labor buys exactly one unit
of home labor. The equilibrium is at 𝑒1 , where the level of production remains unchanged at 𝑧1 .
For illustration purposes, let the price of 𝜎𝑠1 be reduced to 𝜋1′ < 𝑤. In this case one unit
of market labor buys more than one unit of home labor, so it is optimal to use the time required
by that activity in the labor market. The budget constraint moves to 𝑐2 𝜅̅ and production increases
up to 𝑧2 = 𝑥1∗ , where the asterisk denotes that the value of 𝑥1 under 𝜋1′ is optimal. The new
equilibrium is found at 𝑒2 , where home labor is 𝜎 ∗ = (1 − 𝜎𝑠1 )𝑥1∗ , market labor is 𝜅̅ − 𝜎 ∗ , and
𝜎𝑠1 𝑥1∗ = 𝜎𝑠1 𝑧2 is the amount of time purchased in the market. Production increases under 𝜋1′
because the individual has been able to increase the amount of “effective” time used from 𝜅̅ , as
defined by (4.b), to 𝜅̅ + 𝜎𝑠1 𝑥1∗ . Whenever the cost of an additional time-saving share is lower
than the wage rate, production maximization leads to a net gain of effective time.

11

The new isoquant is no longer vertical when 𝜎 + 𝜎𝑠1 𝑥1 ≤ 𝑥1 ; it has a slope equal to −1/𝜎𝑠 according to (3.a), and
meets the vertical axis at ℎ1 . This is because the purchase of 𝑥1 is equivalent to an increase of 𝑥0 accompanied with
additional time that further increases 𝑧.
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Figure 1. Time-saving goods and production of a basic commodity
𝑥𝑖
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It is apparent that the level of the wage rate 𝑤 determines the specific time-saving good
𝑥𝑛 that maximizes the level of production, and thus also the amount of time savings that the
product maximizing individual will obtain.12 In general, as long as time-saving shares of
increasing market prices are individually added by subsequent time-saving goods, the specific
time-saving good 𝑥𝑛 that leads to the optimal level of production 𝑧 ∗ will be the one that adds the
most expensive time-saving share 𝜎𝑠𝑛 that satisfies 𝜋𝑛 ≤ 𝑤.
It is also apparent that the higher the wage rate the greater the total time-saving share will
be. Assuming for convenience the presence of infinitely many 𝑥𝑖 available in the market for the
production of 𝑧, then 𝜎𝑠 = 𝜎𝑠 (𝑤, 𝑝, 𝜋1 , … , 𝜋𝑛 ) can be defined as a differentiable function that
describes the total time-saving share associated with the solution to the production problem, and
write this conclusion as

12

An increase in non-labor income makes additional time savings affordable and consequently may imply that it is
optimal to use goods for which 𝜋𝑖 > 𝑤. For the sake of clarity, this case is disregarded and income is assumed to be
obtained only from labor.
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𝜕𝜎𝑠
𝜕𝑤

≥0;

(6)

which is defined for 𝜎𝑠 ∈ [0,1] and holds with equality when 𝜎𝑠 = 1. The individual will
purchase additional time savings (in the form of a more expensive time-saving good) up to the
point where 𝜋𝑛 = 𝑤, which describes the value of 𝜎𝑠 that maximizes production for a given
budget constraint and level of leisure. Furthermore, if 𝑤 is high enough, it is plausible to fully
eliminate home labor, such that 𝜎𝑠 = 1.
3. Utility maximization with time-saving goods
This section analyzes the solution to the utility maximization problem with time-saving goods
and one basic commodity 𝑧. Leisure is treated as an endogenous variable and the time available
for production, assumed fixed in the previous section, is thus allowed to vary as well.
Considering the form of the production function in (2) and assuming 𝜋𝑛 = 𝑤, we know
that at the solution to the production problem 𝑥𝑛 = 𝑧. Maintaining the assumptions that there are
infinitely many market goods 𝑥𝑖 and that 𝜎 = 𝜎(∙) is a differentiable function (described at the
end of the last section), the optimal production condition (3.b) and the budget constraint (4.b) can
be rewritten as
𝜎 = (1 − 𝜎𝑠 )𝑧 ,

(7.a)

𝑤𝜆 = (𝑝 + 𝜋𝜎𝑠 )𝑧 ,

(7.b)

where the market price of 𝜎𝑠 is represented by 𝜋 < 𝜋𝑛 = 𝑤, which is from now on assumed to
be constant. 13

13

This assumption is made for simplicity, even though (the higher prices of) additional time-saving shares
necessarily increase 𝜋. Since prices 𝜋𝑖 and the total time-saving share 𝜎𝑠 (∙) vary simultaneously and in the same
direction, this assumption does not significantly affect the results of the model.
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The individual maximizes a quasi-concave, twice-differentiable utility function 𝑢(𝑧, 𝜌)
whose value increases with the consumption 𝑧 and leisure time 𝜌. Using this function as well as
the constraints (1), (7.a) and (7.b), the Lagrangian expression of the problem is
𝐿 = 𝑢(𝑧, 𝜌) + 𝛼(𝑤𝜅 − 𝑤𝜌 − [𝑝 + 𝜋𝜎𝑠 + 𝑤(1 − 𝜎𝑠 )]𝑧) ,
where 𝛼 is the multiplier, equal to the marginal utility of income. The first order conditions for
the optimal choices of 𝑧 and 𝜌 lead to the following optimal condition:
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝜌
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑧

𝑤

= 𝑝+𝜋𝜎 +𝑤(1−𝜎 ) .
𝑠

(8)

𝑠

The right hand side of (8) represents the opportunity cost of leisure, while its denominator
corresponds to 𝑃, the full price of 𝑧. Provided 𝑤 > 𝜋, an increase in 𝜎𝑠 reduces 𝑃 and increases
the opportunity cost of leisure. Since the individual is assumed to be able to freely substitute
among infinitely many market goods with different time-saving shares and market prices, then
the marginal effect of 𝑤 on 𝑃 is
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑤

𝜕𝜎

= 1 − 𝜎𝑠 − (𝑤 − 𝜋) 𝜕𝑤𝑠 .

Provided (6) and 𝑤 > 𝜋, the effect of 𝑤 on 𝑃 can be positive or negative, but it will necessarily
decrease with the time-saving share 𝜎𝑠 and marginal time savings 𝜕𝜎𝑠 ⁄𝜕𝑤.14
Figure 2 describes the optimal time allocation decision in the presence of time-saving
goods. The vertical axis represents the basic commodity 𝑧 and the horizontal axis represents
time, with the sum of home labor and leisure increasing rightward, and market labor increasing
from the time constraint 𝜅 to the left. The budget constraint 𝑑1 𝜅 corresponds to a situation in

14

Boadway and Gahvari (2006) also allow for the full price of 𝑧 to change with 𝑤, but do not account for the effect
of 𝑤 on time savings or, equivalently, on the home labor requirement of market goods.
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which individual’s home labor 𝜎 is fully replaced with time savings (𝜎𝑠 = 1). As in the most
traditional time allocation framework where by assumption 𝜎 = 0, any equilibrium point on this
budget constraint separates total time available into leisure and market labor. For example, the
equilibrium at 𝑒1 (indifference curves not shown) is associated with a level of consumption 𝑧 ∗ ,
leisure time 𝜌1∗ and market labor 𝜆1∗ .
In contrast, if income is not high enough to fully replace home labor (𝜎𝑠 < 1) then 𝑃
would be higher and the opportunity cost of leisure lower. This situation is represented by the
budget constraint 𝑑2 𝜅. More time must be spent in home labor per unit of 𝑧 consumed, leaving
less time available for leisure. The new equilibrium at 𝑒2 is, for clarity, assumed to be associated
with the same consumption level 𝑧 ∗ and market labor 𝜆1∗ , but leisure has been reduced to 𝜌2∗ and
home labor, equal to the horizontal distance between the two budget constraints at 𝑧 ∗ , has
increased up to 𝜎2∗ = (1 − 𝜎𝑠 )𝑧 ∗ .
Subsequent reductions of 𝜎𝑠 continue to increase the full price of 𝑧 until it reaches its
maximum when 𝜎𝑠 = 0, where 𝑃 = 𝑝 + 𝑤. Importantly, nothing ensures that leisure is greater
than zero in that case. The equilibrium at 𝑒3 shows a situation in which the time available is
depleted by market and home labor, and no time is left for leisure.
Two polar cases can be recognized in Figure 2. For any given level of non-labor income,
there may be a minimum wage rate 𝑤 ℎ for which (and above which) home labor is zero, as in
point 𝑒1 . Similarly, there may be a maximum wage rate 𝑤 𝑙 for which (and below which) leisure
is zero, as in point 𝑒3 . In the presence of home labor requirements, case 𝑤 ℎ implies 𝜎𝑠 = 1 and
case 𝑤 𝑙 implies 𝜎𝑠 = 0. Home labor and leisure are both greater than zero if and only if the
individual’s wage rate is 𝑤 and 𝑤 𝑙 < 𝑤 < 𝑤 ℎ .
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Figure 2. Utility maximization with time-saving goods
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The different patterns of time allocation for high and low income individuals imply that
the traditional concept of income inequalities is associated with a similar concept of time
inequalities, whereby low-income individuals are less able to enjoy leisure time than highincome individuals.15 This conclusion is relevant for the optimal tax literature, routinely
concerned with finding efficient mechanisms to indirectly tax leisure. The next section analyzes
some of the consequences of considering time savings and time inequalities in the theory of
optimal commodity taxation.

15

The related concept of time poverty was introduced by Vickery (1977) to describe those cases where the time
available for home production is below a predefined poverty threshold. This definition does not imply, however, that
time poverty is related to income poverty. Recent discussions about time poverty can be found in Zacharias (2011),
Antonopoulos, Masterson and Zacharias (2012), and Merz and Rathjen (2014).
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4. Time savings and optimal commodity taxation
The time inequalities created by differences in access to time-saving goods have
important implications for optimal taxation. One is that commodity tax rates for high-income
individuals that are able to eliminate home labor should be assigned in accordance to the original
Corlett and Hague (1953-54) rule: Optimal tax rates are higher for those goods that are more
complementary to leisure. This conclusion is equivalent to the one reached by Boadway and
Gahvari (2006) for the case in which all the time spent in consumption is a perfect leisuresubstitute. Under that assumption the time spent in consumption is always enjoyable, a situation
that can be reproduced with time-saving goods when 𝜎𝑠 = 1. The case of labor-substitutes
considered by Boadway and Gahvari (2006) is captured by a situation in which it is not optimal
to fully eliminate home labor (𝜎𝑠 < 1). It is under this condition that the presence of time savings
leads to adjustments to the original Corlett and Hague rule, as well as to the correction of optimal
tax rules derived by recent contributions incorporating home production into the optimal tax
problem.
In order to analyze the effects of time-saving goods on the traditional Corlett and Hague
rule, the model introduced in Section 3 is modified to include many basic commodities 𝑧𝑗 , 𝑗 =
1, … , 𝐽, each produced with one non-time-saving good with normalized price 𝑝 and a time-saving
component 𝜎𝑠𝑗 with a given market price 𝜋𝑗 . Taken together, these two components can be
considered as one market good 𝑥𝑗 with producer price 𝑝 + 𝜋𝑗 𝜎𝑠𝑗 . Considering a per unit tax 𝑡𝑗
the full price of 𝑧𝑗 is 𝑃𝑗 = 𝑝 + 𝜋𝑗 𝜎𝑠𝑗 + 𝑡𝑗 + 𝑤(1 − 𝜎𝑠𝑗 ). Given that 𝑡𝑗 reduces the purchasing
power of the individual, it is assumed to have a negative effect on 𝜎𝑠𝑗 . Provided 𝑤 ≥ 𝜋𝑗 , the
effect of 𝑡𝑗 on 𝑃𝑗 is
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𝜕𝑃𝑗
𝜕𝑡𝑗

= 1 − (𝑤 − 𝜋𝑗 )

𝜕𝜎𝑠𝑗
𝜕𝑡𝑗

≥1.

The greater the reduction of 𝜎𝑠𝑗 due to the tax, the greater the marginal (positive) effect of 𝑡𝑗 on
the full price 𝑃𝑗 .
Using 𝑧̅ to denote the vector of all basic commodities, the corresponding Lagrangian and
first order conditions are
𝐽

𝐿′ = 𝑢(𝑧̅, 𝜌) + 𝛼(𝑤𝜅 − 𝑤𝜌 − ∑𝑗=1 𝑃𝑗 𝑧𝑗 )
(𝑧𝑘 )
(𝜌)

𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑧𝑘
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝜌

− 𝛼𝑃𝑗 = 0 , 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐽 ,

− 𝛼𝑤 = 0 .

The solution to this problem leads to demand functions 𝑧𝑗 (𝑃̅, 𝑤), 𝜌(𝑃̅, 𝑤), and the indirect utility
𝑣(𝑃̅, 𝑤), where 𝑃̅ is the vector of full prices. Since by assumption one unit of a basic commodity
is produced with one unit of a market good, then 𝑥𝑗 (𝑃̅, 𝑤) = 𝑧𝑗 (𝑃̅, 𝑤), and 𝑃𝑗 can be interpreted
as the full price of 𝑥𝑗 . The Lagrangian expression for this problem can therefore be rewritten as
𝐿′′ = 𝑣(𝑃̅, 𝑤) − 𝛼(𝑤𝜅 − 𝑤𝜌 − ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑃𝑗 𝑥𝑗 ) .
By the envelope theorem
𝜕𝑣 𝜕𝑃𝑘
𝜕𝑃𝑘 𝜕𝑡𝑘

𝜕𝑃

= −𝛼 𝜕𝑡 𝑘 𝑥𝑘 ,
𝑘

(9)

where 𝜕𝑃𝑘 ⁄𝜕𝑡𝑘 = 1 − (𝑤 − 𝜋𝑘 ) 𝜕𝜎𝑠𝑘 ⁄𝜕𝑡𝑘 ≥ 1.
The problem for the government is to choose the commodity tax rates 𝑡𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, that
maximize individual utility given an exogenously determined revenue requirement 𝑅. The

19

corresponding Lagrangian expression and the first order condition for the optimal choice of 𝑡𝑘
are
𝐿′′′ = 𝑣(𝑃̅, 𝑤) + 𝜇{−𝑅 + ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑡𝑗 𝑥𝑗 (𝑃̅, 𝑤)} ,
𝜕𝑥 𝜕𝑃𝑘

𝜕𝑣 𝜕𝑃𝑘

+ 𝜇 [𝑥𝑘 + ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑡𝑗 𝜕𝑃𝑗

𝜕𝑃𝑘 𝜕𝑡𝑘

𝑘

𝜕𝑡𝑘

]=0,

where 𝜇 is the multiplier, equal to the marginal welfare cost of tax collections. Using (9) and the
Slutzky equation, the first order condition is equal to
𝜕𝑃

𝜕𝑥 𝑐

𝜕𝑃

𝜕𝑥

−𝛼 𝜕𝑡 𝑘 𝑥𝑘 + 𝜇𝑥𝑘 + 𝜇 𝜕𝑡 𝑘 ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑡𝑗 (𝜕𝑃𝑗 − 𝑥𝑘 𝜕𝑚𝑗 ) = 0 ,
𝑘

𝑘

𝑘

where 𝑥𝑗𝑐 is the compensated demand for 𝑥𝑗 and 𝑚 is non-labor income. Dividing by
𝜇𝑥𝑘 𝜕𝑃𝑘 ⁄𝜕𝑡𝑘 and using symmetry of substitution we obtain
1
𝜕𝑃𝑘
𝜕𝑡𝑘

𝜕𝑥 𝑐

1

𝜕𝑥

𝛼

+ 𝑥 ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑡𝑗 𝜕𝑃𝑘 = 𝜇 + ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑡𝑗 𝜕𝑚𝑗 .
𝑘

𝑗

Given that the right hand side of this equation is identical for all 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐽, and considering for
simplicity only 𝑘 = 1,2, we can write
1
𝜕𝑃1
𝜕𝑡1

1 𝜕𝑥1𝑐
1 𝜕𝑃1

+ 𝑡1 [𝑥

1 𝜕𝑥2𝑐
]
2 𝜕𝑃1

−𝑥

=

1
𝜕𝑃2
𝜕𝑡2

1 𝜕𝑥2𝑐
2 𝜕𝑃2

+ 𝑡2 [𝑥

1 𝜕𝑥1𝑐
]
1 𝜕𝑃2

−𝑥

.

Multiplying the parenthesis in the left hand side by 𝑃1 ⁄𝑃1 and the parenthesis in the right hand
side by 𝑃2 ⁄𝑃2 ,
1
𝜕𝑃1
𝜕𝑡1

𝑡

+ 𝑃1 [𝜀𝑥𝑐1 ,𝑃1 − 𝜀𝑥𝑐2 ,𝑃1 ] =
1

1
𝜕𝑃2
𝜕𝑡2

𝑡

+ 𝑃2 [𝜀𝑥𝑐2,𝑃2 − 𝜀𝑥𝑐1 ,𝑃2 ] ,
2

(10)

where 𝜀𝑥𝑐𝑘,𝑃𝑗 is the compensated price elasticity of 𝑥𝑘 with respect to 𝑃𝑗 . Provided that the
demand functions 𝑥𝑘 (𝑃̅, 𝑤) are homogeneous of degree 0, the Euler’s theorem implies that
20

𝜀𝑥𝑐𝑘,𝑃1 + 𝜀𝑥𝑐𝑘 ,𝑃2 + 𝜀𝑥𝑐𝑘,𝑤 = 0, where 𝑤 stands as the price of leisure. Using this equality, (10) can
be rewritten as
𝑡1

[𝜀 𝑐
𝑃1 𝑥1 ,𝑃1

+

𝜀𝑥𝑐2 ,𝑃2

+

𝜀𝑥𝑐2 ,𝑤 ]

−

𝑡2

[𝜀 𝑐
𝑃2 𝑥1 ,𝑃1

+

𝜀𝑥𝑐2 ,𝑃2

+

𝜀𝑥𝑐1 ,𝑤 ]

=

𝜕𝑃1 𝜕𝑃2
−
𝜕𝑡1
𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑃1 𝜕𝑃2
𝜕𝑡1 𝜕𝑡2

.

(11)

The classic Corlett and Hague rule can easily be obtained from this result. For the high-income
case where time savings are no longer possible, 𝜕𝜎𝑠𝑘 ⁄𝜕𝑡𝑘 = 0 and 𝜕𝑃𝑘 ⁄𝜕𝑡𝑘 = 1, such that the
right hand side of (11) is zero. Provided 𝜀𝑥𝑐1 ,𝑃1 + 𝜀𝑥𝑐2 ,𝑃2 < 0, the highest proportional tax rate
𝑡𝑘 ⁄𝑃𝑘 should be imposed on that good that is more complementary with leisure, which is the
good with the lowest 𝜀𝑥𝑐𝑘,𝑤 . Without loss of generality, we can assume that good 1 is more
complementary with leisure (𝜀𝑥𝑐1 ,𝑤 < 𝜀𝑥𝑐2 ,𝑤 ). In accordance to the Corlett and Hague rule, in this
case 𝑡1 ⁄𝑃1 > 𝑡2 ⁄𝑃2 . The good that is more complementary to leisure should face a tax that
represents a greater proportion of the full price of the good.
Whenever 𝜎𝑠𝑘 < 1, the full price of 𝑥𝑘 is higher than its market price 𝑝 + 𝜋𝑘 𝜎𝑠𝑘 + 𝑡𝑘 ,
and this difference decreases with the value of 𝜎𝑠𝑘 . This is important because it implies that the
optimal tax 𝑡𝑘∗ computed under (11) represents a smaller tax rate with respect to the market price
as the opportunity cost of home labor, 𝑤(1 − 𝜎𝑠𝑘 ), increases as a proportion of 𝑃𝑘 . Provided that
𝑝 is the same for all goods, and given that time savings and their prices are expected to change in
the same direction, then the tax rate decreases with more time savings. Goods that save more
time per dollar in average should be taxed at lower rates than in the Corlett and Hague rule. This
result is similar to previous findings by Kleven, Richter, and Sorensen (2000) and Kleven
(2004), who call for lower tax rates on market services that reduce home labor,16 and by Gahvari

Kleven (2004) explicitly mentions market goods that “save time”; however, he does not introduce costly time
savings in his model.
16
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and Yang (1993), who suggest to apply higher tax rates on goods with greater time requirements.
In these cases, it does not matter whether the home labor time is enjoyable or not. The result
obtained is, however, equivalent to the Boadway and Gahvari’s (2006) conclusion about
applying higher tax rates to goods that require more (unpleasant) home labor.
The explicit account of costly time savings adds new insights to the problem of the
optimal taxation of time. As long as time savings are used to increase (pure) leisure time, or
correspond to improvements that make consumption enjoyable, then leisure is being purchased
in the market at price 𝜋𝑘 . Contrary to the common presumption in the literature, leisure is (at
least partially) taxable, and it should receive favorable tax treatment under an optimal
commodity tax system for two reasons. One is that leisure is available in the market through time
savings that should be subject to lower tax rates; the other is that leisure is taxed at its market
price 𝜋𝑘 , which is lower than 𝑤. In contrast, home labor is subject to higher optimal commodity
tax rates applied on its opportunity cost 𝑤. This means that tax policy prescriptions available in
the literature may have unintended regressive effects: Since lower-income individuals are less
able to purchase time savings, then they would be faced with higher tax rates.
Based on (11), a new tax rule not yet identified in the literature can be formulated. If
𝜎𝑠𝑘 < 1 for at least one market good 𝑘, the right hand side of (11) will likely be different than
zero. It would be negative if 𝑡1 has a smaller effect on the corresponding full price than 𝑡2 (𝑡1 has
a smaller impact on time savings per dollar than 𝑡2 ), and in that case 𝑡1 ⁄𝑃1 should be higher than
suggested by the Corlett and Hague rule. Alternatively, the right hand side of (11) is positive
when 𝑡1 has a greater effect on time savings per dollar than 𝑡2 , and in that case 𝑡1 ⁄𝑃1 should be
lower than suggested by the Corlett and Hague rule. In the latter case, contrary to the Corlett and
Hague rule, the good that is more complementary with leisure could be associated with the
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lowest optimal tax rate.17 The intuition is simple. Goods that offer relatively more time savings
per dollar in the margin should also be taxed at a lower rate that other goods in order to make
more time available for market labor and leisure. This rule allows to partially correct for the
regressive effects of taxes in the presence of costly time-saving goods, by minimizing the impact
of tax rates on the home labor requirements of lower-income individuals.
The results obtained in (11) can be summarized by a new “time-saving rule,” which calls
for lower tax rates on goods that provide greater time savings, both in average and in the margin,
and that becomes more relevant as the goods are purchased by lower-income individuals. As
long as 0 < 𝜎𝑠𝑘 < 1 the time-saving rule must be considered together with the traditional Corlett
and Hague rule to obtain the optimal tax rates. Two special cases are obtained when either
leisure is zero or home labor is zero. When a low-income individual can no longer buy any
leisure (𝜎𝑠𝑘 = 0), complementarity with leisure becomes irrelevant and thus 𝜀𝑥𝑐1 ,𝑤 = 𝜀𝑥𝑐2 ,𝑤 = 0,
implying that only the time-saving rule applies. In contrast, if time-saving goods allow a
consumer to fully eliminate home labor (𝜎𝑠𝑘 = 1), then the classic Corlett and Hague rule
applies and time requirements for consumption are irrelevant. 18
In order to identify the different implications of alternative tax rules, consider the basic
commodity “going to the beach,” in which being at the beach is assumed to be nontaxable (pure)
enjoyable leisure. The individual can either drive to the beach, in which case requires to purchase
the market goods “parking at the beach” (there is nothing but beach around) and “gasoline,” or
can use “public transportation,” which is cheaper but requires more time. According to the
original Corlett and Hague rule, parking at the beach and public transportation (to the beach), the

17

Of course, when time savings per dollar are equal across goods, then the rule has no effect on optimal tax rates.
As mentioned, Boadway and Gahvari (2006) explicitly made a similar provision when discussing the case of only
leisure-substitutes.
18
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goods that are more complementary to leisure, should face tax rates higher than gasoline, which
is also used for purposes different than leisure. Gahvari and Yang (1993) and Kleven (2004)
would recommend tax rates that are positively related to time intensities, implying that both
parking per hour and gasoline (proportional to time used driving) should be taxed at higher rates
than under the Corlett and Hague rule, but they should face lower tax rates than public
transportation.
In contrast, Boadway and Gahvari (2006) would suggest to tax parking at a positive but
relatively low rate, since it is related with pleasant leisure time, while gasoline and public
transportation should be taxed at higher rates because they represent unpleasant transportation.
This policy would be partially consistent with the time-saving rule proposed in this paper,
specifically in what regards to average time savings when income is not very high. For very
high-income individuals, time savings are smaller or nil, thus the Corlett and Hague rule is more
relevant and the tax on parking should be relatively high. Finally, when marginal time savings
are considered, these results can change dramatically. If the effect of taxing parking and gasoline
is that lower-income individuals start using public transportation, which requires more time, then
it may be optimal to tax those goods at rates lower than other goods in the market – as long as
they are used by lower-income individuals.
Since low-income individuals can generally be expected to be more sensitive to changes
in tax rates, the reduction in optimal tax rates, or even the optimal subsidies, will be more
prevalent among them. It follows that, whenever possible, the optimal commodity tax system
should treat differently the goods and services purchased by low- and high-income individuals.
Proposition 1 summarizes these results.
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4.1 Proposition 1: Optimal commodity tax rule.
If each unit of a basic commodity 𝑧𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, is produced with one unit of the market
good 𝑥𝑗 , which among all market goods available to produce 𝑧𝑗 is the one that maximizes its
production, and if 𝑥𝑗 has a market price 𝑝 + 𝜋𝑗 𝜎𝑠𝑗 + 𝑡𝑗 and a full price 𝑃𝑗 = 𝑝 + 𝜋𝑗 𝜎𝑠𝑗 + 𝑡𝑗 +
𝑤(1 − 𝜎𝑠𝑗 ), then the commodity tax rule implicit in (11) can be described, for three possible
scenarios based on the level of taxpayer’s income, as:
Scenario 1: High income level 𝑤 > 𝑤 ℎ ; 𝜎𝑠𝑗 = 1 for all 𝑗 and home labor 𝜎 = 0.
i.

The market price and the full price of 𝑥𝑗 are identical, thus differences in average time
savings per dollar do not lead to different tax rates among market goods.

ii.

The marginal effect of a tax on the full price of any market good is unity (𝜕𝑃1 /𝜕𝑡1 =
1), thus the right hand side of (11) is zero and marginal time savings per dollar do not
lead to different tax rates among market goods.

iii.

Time savings per dollar, in average and in the margin, are irrelevant. Only the Corlett
and Hague rule applies in this scenario.

Scenario 2: Intermediate level of income; 0 < 𝜎𝑠𝑗 < 1 for all 𝑗 and home labor 𝜎 > 0.
iv.

The market price is lower than the full price of 𝑥𝑗 , thus market goods that provide more
time savings per dollar, in average, should be taxed at rates lower than the ones
prescribed by the Corlett and Hague rule.

v.

The marginal effect of a tax on the full price is greater on market goods that provide
greater time savings in the margin. These market goods should be taxed at rates lower
than the ones prescribed by the Corlett and Hague rule.
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vi.

Time savings per dollar, in average and in the margin, lead to a reduction of the tax
rates prescribed by the Corlett and Hague rule.

Scenario 3: Low income level 𝑤 < 𝑤 𝑙 ; 𝜎𝑠𝑗 = 0 for all 𝑗 and leisure 𝜌 = 0. Market goods are
no longer leisure complements, thus 𝜀𝑥𝑐1 ,𝑤 = 𝜀𝑥𝑐2 ,𝑤 = 0 and the Corlett and Hague rule is
irrelevant.
vii. The market price is lower than the full price of 𝑥𝑗 , thus market goods that provide more
time savings per dollar, in average, should be taxed at lower rates.
viii. The marginal effect of a tax is zero because 𝜎𝑠𝑗 is at its minimum value. Marginal time
savings per dollar are irrelevant.
ix.

Greater average time savings per dollar are associated with lower optimal tax rates.
This proposition assumes, as it is commonly done in the literature, that the market offers

a significant number of alternatives to those goods subject to higher taxes. It is apparent,
however, that time-saving goods are fewer when the level of income is reduced and, other things
equal, that individuals do not voluntarily choose market goods with lower time savings. Instead,
the level of income determines the ability to purchase time savings in the market and some
individuals, especially those with lower income levels, may be forced to produce basic
commodities with a greater share of their own time endowments. In this context, the taxation of
home labor should be subject to considerations that are generally disregarded in the literature. If
home labor is not enjoyable and does not create income, then even if it is used to produce goods
that replace taxed market goods, it is not obvious that it should receive the same tax treatment as
leisure and market labor. This position contradicts recent results in the literature. For instance,
Kleven (2004) and Boadway and Gahvari (2006) suggest that the solution to the tax problem is
first-best when all goods are taxed in accordance to time intensities or all goods are labor26

substitutes, respectively. In these two cases a first best solution is obtained by applying higher
tax rates to goods associated with more home labor. Notably, in line with the conclusion of
favoring time-saving goods, Kleven, Richter and Sorensen (2000) suggest to impose lower tax
rates on services that are close substitutes of home labor, and Kleven (2004) suggests to favor
goods that require little home labor or even save time. However, in both cases the goal is to
discourage home labor, which the same as leisure is considered a good that should be taxed but
can be easily hidden from the tax authorities. They do not consider the marginal effects of taxes
on time savings and thus do not allow for goods requiring more home labor to receive favorable
tax treatment in the absence of affordable time-saving substitutes.
The negative effect of taxes on the affordability of time savings can be used as an
argument in favor of a tax on luxuries and, more generally, a progressive tax system. To the
extent that individuals with different levels of income purchase different time-saving goods,
luxury taxes would help to shift the tax burden away from low-income taxpayers. Furthermore,
regardless of whether that condition holds or not, the lack of affordable substitutes for lowincome individuals implies that differential tax rates cannot effectively provide them with
incentives to reduce home labor. Higher tax rates on goods associated with more home labor may
result instead in greater welfare costs of taxation and possibly in zero or even negative marginal
tax revenue. This suggests that, in a many-person economy, the optimal revenue requirement
associated with low-income individuals should be relatively small. As long as this argument
applies to the amount of tax revenue and not to particular market goods, the optimal degree of
progressivity can be implemented with the use of the personal income tax.
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4.2 Homotheticity and weak separability
Important results of optimal tax theory depend on the assumptions of homotheticity of
preferences for goods (or basic commodities), and weak separability of goods and leisure. In the
context of the one consumer Ramsey problem, Sandmo (1974) proved that differential
commodity taxes are unnecessary when goods and leisure are separable and the subutility of
goods is homothetic. The same conclusion about differential taxes was reached by Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976) for the case of a non-linear income tax and weakly separable preferences between
leisure and goods. Similarly, Deaton (1979) showed that if, in addition to the separability
assumption, Engel curves for goods are linear, optimal commodity taxes can be uniform even
when the government is restricted to an (optimal) linear income tax.
These results generally do not hold in the presence of alternative market goods offering
costly time savings for the production of a given basic commodity. To see this, note that when
income increases, goods providing small time savings become inferior and are eventually
replaced by goods that offer greater time savings. This implies that the marginal rate of
substitution between any two goods, say between two substitutes providing different time
savings, changes with the level of income, and thus preferences cannot be homothetic or display
linear Engel curves. Regarding weak separability between leisure and goods, it suffices to
consider the two polar (high and low income) cases defined in the previous sections, and to
realize that the set of goods consumed with and without leisure will most likely differ.
We can conclude that in the presence of time-saving goods the theory cannot recommend
the exclusion of commodity taxes from the optimal solution to the tax problem, and that the
optimal commodity tax rule described by Proposition 1 is relevant in the design of that solution.
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5. Conclusions
Time-saving goods are very common in the real economy but have not yet received
attention in the literature. This paper formally introduces this concept and analyzes the effects of
costly time-saving gains on the allocation of time and optimal taxes at different levels of income.
Given an exogenous revenue requirement, optimal commodity tax rates should be set in
accordance to two rules. The traditional Corlett and Hague rule, by which goods more
complementary with leisure should bear a higher tax rate, is especially relevant for high income
individuals that spend little or no time on home labor. The time-saving rule derived in this paper,
by which goods that save more time per dollar, in average and in the margin, should be assigned
a smaller tax rate, is more relevant when income decreases and low income individuals spend
more time on home labor. Differential commodity taxation is required to minimize home labor
time, especially for low-income individuals.
Two natural extensions to this paper are the empirical analysis of available data on time
use and the study of how time inequalities should be addressed by an optimal tax system. Much
can be said regarding the appropriate redistributive tax policies in a system that explicitly
considers the use of linear or non-linear income taxes and transfers.
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